This paper concerns two fundamental but somewhat neglected issues, both related to the design and analysis of randomized on-line algorithms. Motivated by early results in game theory we define several types of randomized on-line algorithms, discuss known conditions for their equivalence, and give a natural example distinguishing between two kinds of randomizations. In particular, we show that mixed randomized memoryless paging algorithms can achieve strictly better competitive performance than behavioral randomized algorithms. Next we summarize known and derive new ``Yao principle'' theorems for lower bounding competitive ratios of randomized on-line algorithms. This leads to four different theorems for boundedÂunbounded and minimizationÂmaximiza-tion problems. ]
for lower bounds) in the analysis of randomized algorithms to define randomized algorithms as probability distributions on deterministic algorithms. In particular, we often adopt this latter view in order to apply the Yao principle, which allows us to infer a lower bound for randomized algorithms by considering input distributions for deterministic algorithms. Needless to say, matching an upper bound, based on one model, of randomization with a lower bound based on a different model is only meaningful if the lower bound model is at least as powerful as the upper bound model. We shall see that there are natural situations where this is not the case. Hence we need a more careful study of the relative power of models for randomized algorithms.
The second issue we consider is the application of the Yao principle in the context of randomized on-line algorithms. Online algorithms can introduce some subtlety in applying the Yao principle for several reasons. First, there is a natural ambiguity in how to define the competitive ratio for a randomized algorithm. Second, unlike traditional off-line optimization problems, we often think of on-line problems as having an infinite sequence of requests and, moreover, there may be an infinite number of actions that an on-line algorithm may take to process a given request. Finally, on-line problems can be either cost minimization or profit maximization problems with bounded or unbounded costsÂprofits. We shall see that some care is needed to accommodate these differences.
Section 2 begins with a review of some basic game theoretic definitions and results that are relevant to the foundations of competitive analysis. In particular, we formalize the models discussed above as behavioral and mixed strategies. In Section 3 we consider the important case of games of perfect recall for which there is a known equivalence between behavioral and randomized strategies. However, Section 5 demonstrates that there can be a difference between behavioral and mixed algorithms (in particular, that mixed algorithms can sometimes be more powerful) and we illustrate this by considering``memoryless'' algorithms for paging. Section 6 provides a variety of ways one can apply the Yao principle in the context of competitive analysis, including one example (due to Kirk Pruhs) on how the principle can be improperly applied.
RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES: MIXED, BEHAVIORAL AND GENERAL
In what follows we assume familiarity with the basic game-theoretic definitions of games in extensive and strategic forms. For the reader's convenience we include a review of the basic game theoretic concepts in Appendix B. For simplicity in this section we develop the game theoretic concepts for finite games. The generalization of these concepts to infinite (enumerable) games are straightforward.
Mixed strategies. Let 1 be a finite n-person game (either in extensive or strategic form). A mixed strategy x i for a player i is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies S i . For each pure strategy s # S i we denote by x i (s) the probability to choose s (that is, s # S i x i (s)=1). The interpretation is that the player uses some randomizing device before the start of the game and chooses one pure strategy according to this probability distribution. After that the player's actions are completely deterministic. Given a mixed strategy profile x=(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ), where x i is the mixed strategy of player i, the expected payoff vector H(x) for the n players, is given by H(x)= s x(s) H(s), where s=(s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n ) is any pure strategy profile, H(s) is the vector payoff associated with s (see Appendix B.2), and x(s)=> i # N x i (s i ).
Behavioral strategies. Let 1 be a finite n-person game in extensive form. An alternative way to randomize is to make an independent random choice at each decision point (i.e., at each information set). Such a randomized strategy is called`b ehavioral.'' For complicated games, and also from an algorithmic viewpoint, behavioral strategies often appear to be more``natural.'' Nevertheless, for analysis one would often like to deal with mixed strategies.
Clearly, when defining a behavioral strategy, we must take into consideration the constraints given by the information sets. Since a player cannot distinguish between any two nodes in the same information set, he must use the same randomizing device (i.e., probability distribution) for all nodes in the same information set. Formally, a behavioral strategy
) of probability distributions, where k i is the number of his information sets, U 
, where b i is the behavioral strategy chosen by player i, we let p(l | b) denote the conditional probability that leaf l is reached given b. Then, define the expected payoff vector,
In the context of (off-line) complexity theory it is easy to prove an equivalence, in terms of computational power, between behavioral and mixed algorithms. That is, in the case of worst case analysis of off-line problems whenever there are no memory restrictions on the machine (games of complete information), there is a complete equivalence between two types of randomized algorithms.
2 With regards to games of incomplete information, the situation is similar. Here again, whenever there are no memory restrictions, the two types of randomized are equivalent. However, under memory restrictions the equivalence does not hold anymore and in fact (as we shall see) there is even a third (typically neglected!) type of randomization called general strategies (see Section 2.1). Therefore, one cannot simply assume that all representations of randomized algorithms are equivalent for on-line algorithms. Consider the following example.
Example 1 (The absent-minded driver). Consider a person sitting late at night in a bar after a long evening of drinking (he is currently sober but a little bit absent-minded). In order to return home (payoff 1) he has to take the highway and then get off using the second exit. Getting off at the first exit or continuing on the highway after the second exit will lead to dangerous areas with a risk of being killed (payoff 0). The driver knows that he is absent-minded and realizes, still in the bar, that he would not be able to distinguish between the first and second exits because they look exactly the same. What would be the optimal strategy for this person?
As depicted in Fig. 1 (Appendix A), this problem is easily formulated as a oneperson game in extensive form. Clearly, this is a game of incomplete information as the two decision nodes, a and b, are in the same information set. This means that the player cannot distinguish between them. The set of pure strategies for the player is [L, R] (L for``leave'' the highway and R for``remain'') and any probability mixture of them yields an expected payoff of 0. In contrast, a behavioral strategy that chooses L or R with probability 1Â2 independently, at each decision node has an expected payoff of 1Â4. Hence, in this example a behavioral strategy is strictly superior to mixed strategy.
It is not hard to construct examples that show the converse situation where mixed strategies are superior to behavioral (we shall present one later).
General Strategies
There is yet another class of randomized strategies. Let 1 be a finite n-person game in extensive form. A general strategy for player i is a probability measure on the set of his behavioral strategies B i . Given a general strategy g i for player i we denote by g i (b i ), with b i # B i , the probability of b i . Then, given a general strategy profile g=(g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n ), the definition of the payoff vector H(g) associated with g is as follows. For each behavioral strategy profile b let g(b) be the joint probability
Remark 1. Note that we can define the (expected) payoff vector associated with any strategy profile, where the various strategies of the players can be pure, mixed, behavioral, and general. The definition is straightforward.
Example 2 (Isb57). Consider the two-person zero-sum game in extensive form of Fig. 2 (in Appendix A). This game [Isb57] shows that all three types of randomizations are different. Consider the general strategy that chooses with probability 1Â2 the behavioral strategy b 1 =(3Â4: x 1 , 0: x 2 , 1Â4 : x 3 , 0: y 1 , 1: y 2 ) (i.e., with probability 3Â4 choose x 1 , with probability 0 choose x 2 , and with probability 1Â4 choose x 3 , etc.) and with probability 1Â2 the behavioral strategy b 2 =(0: x 1 , 3Â4: x 2 , 1Â4: x 3 , 1: y 1 , 0: y 2 ). It is not hard to see that this general strategy guarantees the first player an expected payoff of 9Â16. Now consider mixed strategies. Using an optimal mixed strategy the first player will obtain an expected payoff of 1Â2. Finally, it is possible to show that the optimal behavioral strategy for the first player yields an expected payoff of 25Â64.
TWO KNOWN EQUIVALENCE THEOREMS FOR LINEAR GAMES AND GAMES OF PERFECT RECALL
An n-person game in extensive form is called linear if the game tree is such that for each player i no information set of player i is intersected twice by a path from the root to a leaf. It is known that in a linear game every general strategy for any player is equivalent to some mixed strategy. This follows from Lemma 1 below, which states that, in a linear game, behavioral strategies are a special case of mixed strategies. Before we state the lemma it is necessary to define the following equivalence relation between strategies. Let 1 be a game. We say that two strategies of player i, x i and y i , are equivalent if for any strategy profile s [&i] of the other players,
That is, the resulting payoff vector H( } ) (consisting of the payoffs for all players) is the same under x i and y i . It is immediate to see that x i and y i are equivalent if for each leaf l in the game tree the probability of reaching l, given the strategy profile (x i , s [&i] ), equals the probability of reaching l, given the profile ( y i , s [&i] ).
Lemma 1 [Isb57] . Let 1 be a linear game. Then for any behavioral strategy b i for player i there is an equivalent mixed strategy x i .
Hence, in a linear game the set of behavioral strategies B i for player i is, in effect, a subset of the set of his mixed strategies X i . In fact, B i is a small subset of X i . To see that note that the number of independent probabilities (i.e., degrees of freedom) required to specify a behavioral strategy is ;= Theorem 1 [Isb57] . In a linear game every general strategy g i of player i is equivalent to a mixed strategy x i .
Before stating the second known equivalence theorem we define the known concept of``perfect recall.'' Intuitively, a player has perfect recall if at all times during a play, he remembers what he knew, as well as what he chose at all previous decision nodes. Formally, we say that an edge e precedes a decision node v if there is a path on the game tree, starting with e and leading to v. We say that player i has perfect recall if for each edge e, outgoing from an information set U Lemma 2 [Isb57] . Any game in which every player has perfect recall is linear.
The following equivalence theorem is due to Kuhn [Kuhn53] . Remark 2. Kuhn's theorem was proven only for finite games. Nevertheless, this theorem can be extended, in a straightforward manner for infinite games, whenever the length of the game and the number of choices in each information set are at most countable. Further, Kuhn's theorem was extended by Aumann [Aum64] to the case where the number of choices in some information sets is uncountable. Note that in general, games in which time is continuous do not fit in the model presented here.
Corollary 3 [Kun53; Isb57] . In games of perfect recall all three classes of randomized strategies (behavioral, mixed, and general ) are equivalent.
Since every game of complete information (see Appendix B) is, in particular, a game of perfect recall, it is clear that in games of complete information all three classes of randomized strategies are equivalent.
ONLINE ALGORITHMS AND COMPETITIVENESS
We use the basic formulation from Ben-David et al. [BDBK + 94] of``requestanswer games.'' Within this formulation we define on-line and off-line algorithms (and problems), and the competitive ratio performance measure.
A (cost minimization) request-answer game is defined as follows. (It is easy to define the analogous concepts for profit maximization problems.) Let R and W be nonempty sets. R is called the request set and W is called the answer set. Associated with these sets is a sequence of computable cost functions
Denote elements of R and W by r and w, respectively. Each such r is called a request and each w is called an answer. Sequences of requests and answers are denoted by _ and |, respectively. A request sequence is any finite sequence of requests. A deterministic online algorithm ALG is a sequence of functions
is the``answer sequence'' of ALG with respect to the input sequence _. For any input sequence _ with |_| = j, the cost incurred by ALG with respect to _, denoted ALG(_), is defined to be cost j (_, ALG [_] ). An off-line algorithm is a function b : R* Ä W* such that for each input sequence _ with |_| = j,
We denote by OPT a generic optimal off-line algorithm. A deterministic on-line algorithm ALG is c-competitive (or``attains a competitive ratio of c'') if there exists a constant : such that for each request sequence _,
The smallest c such that ALG is c-competitive is called ALG's competitive ratio and is denoted R(ALG). Thus, a c-competitive algorithm is guaranteed to incur a cost no larger than c times the smallest possible cost (in hindsight) for each input sequence (up to the additive constant :).
A bounded cost request answer game is a request answer game such that sup _ cost |_| (_, } ) is finite. A finite request answer game is a bounded cost request answer game with a finite request set and a finite answer set such that there exists a positive integer i 0 such that for all _ with |_|>i 0 , cost |_| (_, } )=cost i 0 (_$, } ), where _$ is the proper i 0 -prefix of _ (i.e., |_$| =i 0 ). It is not hard to see that any finite request answer game is``isomorphic'' to a request answer game where the number of possible deterministic (on-line) algorithms and the number of different request sequences is finite. When dealing with a finite request answer game we require, in the definition of c-competitiveness, that the additive constant : is zero for, otherwise, a sufficiently large additive constant (which may be dependent on the problem description) can allow for arbitrarily small competitive ratios.
We now need to introduce the concept of a randomized algorithm (for a request answer game) and its competitive ratio. As we have seen in Section 2 and Appendix B, there are two prominent approaches for defining the concept of a randomized algorithm: one based on mixed strategies and one on behavioral strategies. (As previously mentioned there is also the combined approach of general strategies.) We shall now briefly consider each of these two approaches in the context of the request-answer formulation. In the mixed strategy approach, a randomized on-line algorithm for a request answer game is a distribution on deterministic algorithms; that is, it is a distribution on sequences (a 1 , a 2 , ...) of answer functions. Of course this distribution is independent of any request sequence. From the behavioral approach, for each time step i, a randomized algorithm provides a distribution on a set of answer functions. Of course, the distribution used at any time step can depend on the request sequence seen thus far. However, if there is``no memory,'' then the distribution at each time step is independent of previous events. Whichever approach we used (i.e., mixed or behavioral) for any input sequence _, we have a well-defined notion of the expected cost E[ALG(_)] of a randomized algorithm ALG on this input. An oblivious adversary for a randomized algorithm, must choose a nemesis request sequence _, based only on the definition of the algorithm, without observing the choices of the algorithm (e.g., without observing the random coin tosses of the algorithm). For any request sequence _, the optimal off-line cost is still well defined and now we can say that a randomized algorithm is c-competitive if there exists a constant : such that for each request sequence _,
The smallest c such that randomized ALG is c-competitive against an oblivious adversary is denoted R OBL (ALG).
For on-line algorithms, in addition to oblvious adversaries, we can also consider the more powerful adaptive adversaries. Informally, an adaptive adversary 4 can observe the behavior of a randomized algorithm and selects the next request as a function of the present configuration of the on-line algorithm (but not knowing the outcome of any future random coin tosses). In this paper we are only concerned with oblivious adversaries but we note that the lower bound for demand paging in Theorem 6 is proven by first considering adaptive adversaries in Theorem 5.
MIXED AND BEHAVIORAL MEMORYLESS PAGING ALGORITHMS
Theorems 1 and 2 (and Examples 1 and 2) are of fundamental importance for competitive analysis. To understand the relevancy of these results it is sufficient to observe the structural properties (in terms of linearity and imperfectÂperfect recall) of extensive form representations of randomized on-line algorithms. Clearly, when the available on-line algorithms have no memory restrictions, the on-line player essentially has perfect recall because during the game he can remember at each time everything he observed in the past. Hence, by Corollary 3 the three kinds of randomized strategies are equivalent.
Nevertheless, whenever there are memory restrictions, for example when the online player is restricted to use bounded memory, the equivalence theorems do not hold. It is not hard to see that the extensive form representation of on-line games, where the on-line player has bounded memory will in general exhibit nonlinearity and imperfect recall. Hence, for such games there is no a-priori equivalence between the three types of randomized strategies and in light of Isbell's example it can be anticipated that no such equivalence is possible. In this section we support this assertion by giving a natural example that distinguishes between memoryless mixed and behavioral on-line``demand paging'' algorithms.
On the one hand, we use a known lower bound for the competitive ratio of any memoryless cat-and-rat behavioral algorithm to obtain a lower bound of k on the competitive ratio of any memoryless behavioral paging algorithm whenever N=k+1 is the number of slow memory pages. On the other hand, we describe a new memoryless mixed paging algorithm which is ((k+1)Â2)-competitive.
Memoryless Behavioral Demand Paging Algorithms
Consider a paging problem with a fast memory of size k and a slow memory of size N>k. A deterministic paging algorithm ALG can be defined as ALG : S_C_R Ä S_C, where S, C and R are the state, configuration and request sets, respectively. (Informally, the configuration of a paging algorithm is simply the contents of its fast memory.) That is, based on its current state and configuration of the algorithm and the present request, ALG changes state and (if the request is not in the current configuration) changes the configuration by evicting exactly one node and then including the present request in the new configuration. In fact, we have defined a demand paging algorithm which never evicts a page unless required (by a request for a page not presently in the cache) to do so. All the common paging algorithms are demand paging algorithms and hereafter we will identify paging with demand paging. 5 A paging algorithm is called bounded memory if S is finite (i.e., independent of the length of the request sequence) and it is called memoryless if |S| =1; i.e., there is only one state, in which case ALG : C_R Ä C.
The same definitions can be applied to randomized algorithms in which case the function ALG is a probabilistic function. Consider a deterministic or randomized memoryless on-line algorithm ALG. Since we assume demand paging, a request for a node that is already in the current configuration is ignored. Therefore in the case of a deterministic algorithm or a randomized algorithm against an adaptive adversary, we can assume that the adversary is``cruel'' which means that it only requests nodes not in the current cache of ALG. When N=k+1 each paging algorithm exposes a single hole at all times and we can summarize the situation as follows: wherever a randomized memoryless algorithm ALG has its hole (say at node u), the adversary requests u, causing ALG to move the hole to some node v (and incur one page fault) according to some distribution that depends only on u.
Coppersmith, Doyle, Raghavan, and Snir [CDRS90] have modeled this situation as a game between an on-line``blind'' 6 cat and an adversarial rat (or mouse) on a complete (k+1)-node graph G=(V, E, d ), where the distance function d is uniform.
7 The cat is situated on some node of the graph and the rat requests (``threatens'') that node, causing the cat to move. The cat's moves are defined by a stochastic matrix P=( p ij ), where p ij is the probability that the cat will move from i to j when i is requested. Note that in general p ij { p ji .
Initially (at the start of a stage), both the cat and the rat are at the same node. Then, after generating a request for that node, the rat moves to some other node. In every step, the adversary generates a request for the node on which the cat is located. Then the cat moves to another node, according to the probabilities on the outgoing edges, from its current node. That is, the cat begins a random walk (determined by P) on the graph. When the cat finally catches the rat (i.e., moves to the node occupied by the rat) the stage ends and a new stage begins.
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5 In the case of unbounded memory, any paging algorithm can be converted to a demand paging algorithm having the same competitive ratio. This is not necessarily the case for the bounded memory algorithms that follow but, again, one usually assumes demand paging for all paging algorithms.
Let
is the hitting time of nodes i and j, where the hitting time is defined to be the expected distance of a random walk (according to P) starting at node i until first landing on node j. The edge stretch factor of the graph G is the maximum stretch factor of any edge in the graph. The stretch factor of a cycle _=u 1 , u 2 , ..., u l , u 1 is the ratio CAT(_)ÂRAT(_) (i.e., the ratio between the cost paid by the cat to the cost paid by the rat). The (cycle) stretch factor of the graph G is the maximum stretch factor of any cycle in G. The following theorems, due to Coppersmith, Doyle, Raghavan, and Snir [CDRS90] provide a lower bound on the competitive ratio of any randomized algorithm for the cat.
Theorem 4 [CDRS90] . For every symmetric weighted N-node graph and for every stochastic matrix P, the cycle stretch factor is at least N&1.
Theorem 5 [CDRS90] . Let G be any symmetric weighted graph and let CAT be any online algorithm (i.e., let P be any stochastic matrix). If the cycle stretch factor of a graph with respect to P is c, then there exists an adaptive adversary (and also an oblivious adversary) that extracts a competitive ratio of c from the online player.
Coppersmith et al. [CDRS90] also prove a converse for Theorem 5, showing that the stretch factor is also an upper bound on the competitive ratio attainable by the cat.
For N=k+1, Coppersmith et al. [CDRS90] apply Theorems 4 and 5 to obtain a lower bound of k for any memoryless paging algorithm against adaptive adversaries. The argument is as follows. The adversary chooses a cycle v 0 , v 1 , ..., v m& having stretch factor c=k. We can assume that initially the adversary (i.e. the rat) and on-line algorithm (the cat) have the same configuration (i.e. occupy the same hole) and that this initial hole is one of the v i . Otherwise, the adversary moves its hole to (say) v 0 and continues to hit nodes other than v 0 until the on-line algorithm moves its hole to v 0 . Whenever, the rat adversary and the cat on-line algorithm occupy the same hole (say v i ) on this cycle, the adversary requests v i and moves its hole to v (i+1) mod m . The adversary then continues to hit the hole of the on-line algorithm until it moves its hole to v (i+1) mod m . In this way, the adversary rat is forcing the cat to take a random walk on the cycle. By definition of the cycle stretch factor, this random walk will have expectation k times the weight of the cycle cost. This result can be extended to oblivious adversaries. The problem with constructing an oblivious adversary is that the adversary does not know where the cat will move in any step, or how long the cat will take to find the rat. Instead, when the rat is in some node v, the adversary can hit every node in the graph except v many times, before hitting v and moving the rat. The number of times each node will be hit should be large enough to guarantee that the on-line cat will pay at least twice the stretch factor unless it reaches v. This way, the expected cost of the on-line player is at least the expected cost conditioned on the on-line player going across that cycle, which (as for the adaptive adversary) is k times the cost of the adversary. We thus have Theorem 6. For N=k+1 the optimal competitive ratio of a memoryless behavioral paging algorithm against an oblivious adversary is k.
Memoryless Mixed Paging Algorithms
Here again we consider the paging problem with N=k+1. Consider the following`p ermutation'' paging algorithm due to Chrobak, Karloff, Payne, and Vishwanathan [CKPV91] .
8
Let ? be a cyclic permutation of [1, 2, ..., N] (i.e., the set of slow memory pages). Let ?
(m) denote the m-fold composition of the (cyclic) permutation ?. Consider the following deterministic``permutation'' algorithm.
Algorithm PERM ? . Upon a page fault on page i evict page ? (m*) (i) such that m* is the minimum m with ?
(m) (i) currently in the cache.
We first note that PERM ? is memoryless (as it does not store any information between successive requests). Note also that when N=k+1 Algorithm PERM ? always evicts page ?(i) on a fault on page i. Further, when N=k+1, ?
(m) (i) is the configuration of PERM ? after m faults, starting in the configuration i.
It is known [CKPV91] that Algorithm PERM ? is k-competitive for all N>k. Clearly, there are (N&1)! different permutation algorithms. Define MIX2PERM to be the uniform mixture of two permutation algorithms, PERM ? 1 and PERM ? 2 , where ? 1 =(123 } } } N) and ? 2 =(NN&1 } } } 1).
Theorem 7. For N=k+1 MIX2PERM is (k+1)Â2-competitive against an oblivious adversary.
The proof of Theorem 7 proceeds as follows. Since N=k+1 we can denote any configuration of a permutation algorithm by an integer in [1, ..., N]. Specifically, when N=k+1 the integer that represents a configuration is the index of the page that is currently not in the fast memory. For all i and j define 
Consider any request sequence. We apply a standard k-phase partition technique.
9 Since N=k+1, during each k-phase the optimal off-line algorithm incurs exactly one fault. It follows that the adversary can benefit by always prolonging each k-phase thus forcing a particular configuration on the on-line algorithm. We thus seek to characterize the behavior of MIX2PERM with respect to such request sequences. Denote by , k ( j) the set of all k-phases that do not include a request to page j (that is, a sequence is in , k ( j) iff it includes references to all pages i{ j). We need the following lemma.
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8 Chrobak et al. called this algorithm ROTATE. 9 The k-phase partition of a request sequence _ is its partition into segments as follows: phase 0 is the empty sequence. For every i&1, phase i is the maximal sequence following phase i&1 that contains at most k distinct page requests (see [ 
Lemma 3. Let , # , k ( j). Then, PERM ? (,), the cost of PERM ? to process ,, is less than or equal to d ? (i, j) if it starts at configuration i.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on n= |,| (where , is any suffix of a k-phase in , k ( j)). The claim clearly holds for the empty suffix. Now, consider the first request ,(1) of ,. If ,(1){i, PERM ? does not change its configuration and by the induction hypothesis, Z i =PERM ? (,(2), ..., ,(n)) d ? (i, j) , with Z i denoting the cost of PERM ? for processing the suffix ,(2), ..., ,(n), starting at configuration i. Otherwise, ,(1)=i and by the induction hypothesis
Note that in the worst case, the inequality in Lemma 14 is replaced with equality. Now, suppose that both permutation algorithms (that is, for permutations ? 1 and ? 2 ) work concurrently and start at configuration i. Consider any k-phase , # , k ( j). It is clear that upon processing , both permutation algorithms will end in configuration j. By Lemma 14 the total cost of both permutation algorithms to process , is k+1. Hence the expected cost of MIX2PERM for this k-phase is (k+1)Â2 and Theorem 13 follows.
This completes the proof of the Theorem 13. The algorithm MIXPERM that uniformly mixes all (N&1)! permutation algorithms is also (k+1)Â2-competitive for N=k+1 (see [BEY98] ). Recently, Chi-Lok Chan (personal communication) has shown that (k+1)Â2 is a lower bound for mixed (and general) strategies of memoryless demand paging and has exhibited counterexamples showing that neither MIX2PERM nor MIXPERM can achieve (k+1)Â2 for N>k+1.
THE YAO PRINCIPLE FOR ON-LINE ALGORITHMS
We refer the reader to Appendix C, where we review the game-theoretic definitions and concepts underlying the Yao principle, as applied to finite games in strategic form, viewing randomized algorithms as mixed strategies. In particular, we now consider unbounded memory on-line randomized algorithms which can (as games of perfect recall) be viewed as mixed strategies. The Yao principle can be used for proving lower bounds on the competitive ratio of randomized on-line algorithms against an oblivious adversary (and thus against all adversary types). For a profit maximization problem the method is essentially the following: to obtain a lower bound of c on the competitive ratio of the best randomized algorithms it is sufficient to choose any probability distribution y over inputs (request sequences) and to bound from below, by c, the ratio of average optimal off-line profit to average on-line profit of any deterministic on-line algorithm (where the expectations are taken with respect to y). In this case, c is a lower bound on the competitive ratio of the best randomized on-line algorithm. As we shall see, there are several variations of this method depending on whether the on-line problem is finite (i.e., the sets of deterministic algorithms and possible request sequences are finite), or not, and whether the payoff function is bounded, or not.
As it turns out, the technique applied for profit maximization problems differs somewhat from its counterpart for cost minimization problems. We first develop the technique for profit maximization problems and then develop it for cost minimization problems.
The Yao Principle for Profit Maximization Problems
A profit maximization request-answer game is called finite if both the set of deterministic on-line algorithms and the set of request sequences are finite. Denote the finite set of deterministic algorithms by A=[ALG 1 , ALG 2 , ..., ALG m ]. Similarly, let the finite set of possible request sequences be 7=[_ 1 , _ 2 , ..., _ n ]. We now define the following two-person zero-sum game G. Player 1 is the on-line player and A is the set of his pure strategies. Player 2 is the adversary and 7 is the set of his pure strategies. It remains to define the payoff function. Here we have several possibilities. Perhaps the most natural choice for the payoff function is h 1 (i, j)= OPT(_ j )ÂALG i (_ j ). At the outset, this choice for the payoff function seems to be natural since it specifies the competitive ratio explicitly. Nevertheless, this is not quite the case. In particular, let us consider the right-hand side of Yao's inequality. (See the inequality in displayed line (8) in Appendix C.) When applied to the matrix H specified by h 1 , we have max
where x=x(i) denotes a mixed strategy for player 1 and E x(i) [ } ] denotes the expectation with respect to x. Similarly we use the same notation for y= y( j) and E y( j) [ } ] . Notice that this expression that is supposed to specify the optimal randomized competitive ratio is not quite compatible with the standard definition of the competitive ratio. In particular, according to the``standard'' definition, the optimal randomized competitive ratio is max
.
But in general for a random variable X, E[1ÂX ]{1ÂE[X ]. Hence, one cannot prove lower bounds on the standard randomized competitive ratio using this definition. 10 As seen in the following example, 11 this confusion may lead to erroneous conclusions.
Example 3 (Wrong use of the Yao Principle). Consider the following on-line problem given by 256 BORODIN AND EL-YANIV 10 But of course, it is certainly possible to define the randomized competitive ratio for a profit maximization problem by using the form (1).
11 This example was given to us by K. Pruhs (personal communication).
The (i, j) entry of this matrix is a fraction of the form OPT(_ j )ÂALG i (_ j ) which corresponds to the payoff function h 1 . Consider the mixed strategy for the adversary,
where H k is the kth harmonic number,
(1). Hence, we have by the Yao Principle that max
(1). Nevertheless, it is easy to verify that mixing ALG 1 and ALG 2 with probabilities 1Â3 and 2Â3 is 1.5-competitive.
A slight modification of the payoff function (i.e., taking 1Âh 1 instead of h 1 and letting Player 1 be the maximizer) yields a correct``Yao's principle.'' Moreover, we can formulate the Yao Principle using a different game. This is summarized in the following theorem whose proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 8 (Yao principle: Finite profit problems). Let G be any finite 12 request-answer game. Let ALG be any on-line randomized algorithm for G and let R OBL (ALG) be the competitive ratio of ALG against an oblivious adversary. Let y( j) be any probability distribution over request sequences. Then,
Example 4. In continuation to Example 3 we now show how to use Theorem 8 to obtain a correct (and tight) lower bound to the problem of Example 3. Consider the following mixed strategy y for the adversary with y i , the ith component of y being
RANDOMIZATION IN ON-LINE COMPUTATION
12 The finiteness requirement ensures that the von Neumann minimax theorem holds. It can be relaxed whenever the request-answer game can be appropriately formulated as a two-person zero-sum game with a payoff function that guarantees minimax (e.g., when this payoff function is continuous; see [Rag94] for other classes of such payoff functions).
Clearly, i y i =1 and it is not hard to see that a lower bound of 3Â2&o(1) can be proved, using this distribution, via Theorem 8 (using the ratio of expectations).
Theorem 8 can be applied only when the von Neumann minimax theorem applies. The minimax theorem always holds with respect to finite games. For infinite games the minimax theorem is known to hold for some particular types of games (e.g., when the payoff function is continuous) but does not hold in general.
13
Hence, one cannot apply Theorem 8 without verifying that the minimax theorem applies. Luckily, for unbounded (and therefore infinite) games we have the following version of the Yao principle that is somewhat more complicated to state but does not rely at all on the minimax theorem. This theorem is an adaptation of a cost minimization variant proved by Borodin, Linial, and Saks [BLS92] for metrical task systems. The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 9 (Yao principle: Unbounded Profit Problems). Let G be any unbounded payoff maximization request-answer game. Let ALG be any randomized online algorithm in G. Let y( j) be any probability distribution over the set of all finite request sequences, [_ j ]. For each positive integer n, let y n ( j) be the marginal distribution over the set of all request sequences of length n [_ n j ].
14 Suppose that two conditions are satisfied:
lim sup
Then, R OBL (ALG) c.
The Yao Principle for Cost Minimization Problems
For cost minimization problems we have two theorems analogous to Theorems 8 and 9 (i.e., for finite and unbounded request-answer games). The theorems for cost minimization and their proofs are almost analogous to the profit maximization theorems. The main difference is with the finite case where, in the case of cost minimization, we do not resort to the inversion of the``natural'' payoff function (h 1 in the case of profit maximization).
Theorem 10 (Yao principle: Finite Cost Problems). Let G be any finite 15 cost minimization request-answer game. Let ALG be any online randomized algorithm for G. Let y( j) be any probability distribution over request sequences. Then,
BORODIN AND EL-YANIV
13 See [Rag94] for a survey that lists all known types of games for which the minimax theorem holds. 14 The marginal distribution y n ( j) is obtained by normalizing probabilities of sequences of length n with respect to the total sum of these probabilities. 15 Here again the finiteness requirement ensures that the von Neumann minimax theorem holds and can be relaxed whenever the request-answer game can be formulated as a two-person zero-sum game with a payoff function that guarantees minimax.
The following theorem is due to Borodin, Linial, and Saks [BLS92] .
Theorem 11 (Yao principle: Unbounded Cost Problems). Let G be any unbounded cost minimization request-answer game. Let ALG be any randomized online algorithm for G. Let y( j) be a probability distribution over the set of all finite request sequences, [_ j ]. For each positive integer n, let y n ( j) be the marginal distribution over the set of all request sequences of length n [_ n j ]. Suppose that two conditions hold:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The use of the Yao principle for on-line algorithms can be a source for some confusion. We hope that by formulating this principle rigorously in the context of competitive on-line analysis we have helped to clarify the applicability of the principle.
The issue of bounded recall, non-linear games and in general, of games involving bounded memory algorithms is not well studied in game theory.
16 Nevertheless, it is of fundamental importance for the theory of computation. Clearly, bounded memory (randomized) algorithms play an important role in algorithm design and analysis. For example, most real-time on-line algorithms are of bounded memory. Thus, this paper only scratches the surface of what we believe to be a wide and important area of research, where we seek to understand the computational power of the various kinds of (bounded memory) randomized algorithms.
To conclude this paper we would like to suggest several directions for future research:
v Games of extensive form are far from satisfactory for representations of bounded memory randomized algorithms. (For example. the reader may want to try to model a few stages of the``competitive game'' of a k-server algorithm with three bits of memory against an adversary using extensive form with the appropriate information sets.) It would be of great interest to devise a more suitable model for games involving bounded memory algorithms.
v Find other examples of natural on-line games where optimal (memory bounded) behavioral, mixed (and general) algorithms attain different competitive ratios. In particular, do the results for demand paging extend to non demand paging algorithms?
v Characterize two-person zero-sum on-line games of imperfect recall (games involving bounded algorithms) for which Kuhn's theorem is still valid. 
APPENDIX B: GAMES IN EXTENSIVE AND STRATEGIC FORMS
There are two primary mathematical abstractions of games, called``extensive'' and``strategic.'' The extensive form representation of a game is what is commonly referred to as a``game tree.'' It explicitly specifies the rules of the game via the order of the moves for the various players, the information and choices available to a player whenever it is one's turn to move and the payoff obtained by all players in any possible play. Indeed, one possible way to depict or imagine a game in extensive form is via a tree.
A game in strategic form (also called``normal form'') is what is commonly referred to as a``matrix game.'' As the name suggests, this representation abstracts away the individual moves and focuses only on strategies. As a more abstract representation of a game it provides an important theoretical tool.
For simplicity, the formulations that follow deal only with finite games that have a finite set of players and finite total number of decision alternatives for each player. Note that the modeling of (competitive analysis of) on-line problems requires in general infinite games (and only two players, the on-line player and the adversary). All the formulations that follow generalize naturally to infinite enumerable games. Later we shall discuss generalizations for infinite games with larger cardinality.
B.1. Games in Extensive Form
An n-person game in extensive form consists of a set N=[1, 2, ..., n] of players and a rooted tree T called the game tree. The game tree has the following structure:
(1) The set of internal nodes of T is partitioned into n+1 subsets P i , i=0, 1, ..., n, where for each i 1 the members of P i are called``the (decision) nodes of player i.'' A node in P i is called a chance node (or a nature node) and for each such node there is an associated probability distribution over its outgoing edges;
(2) All the outgoing edges to descendants of each internal node associated with a player are distinctly labeled by action labels; (3) For each i=1, 2, ..., n, the set P i of decision nodes is partitioned into k i information sets, U
, such that for each information set U i j all the decision nodes in U i j are``isomorphic'' in the sense that they have the same number of outgoing edges, and these outgoing edges have the same labels.
(4) Each leaf of T is labeled by an n-tuple (h 1 , h 2 , ..., h n ) of payoffs.
Under the following interpretation the above model 17 gives a complete description of each``play'' of the game. We define a play of the game 1 as any path from the root to a leaf with the understanding that this path was obtained by the players (and chance) as follows. First note that the role of chance moves is straightforward. If, during a play of the game, a chance node v is reached, the probability distribution associated with v is``invoked'' to choose one outgoing edge of v. The role of players' decision nodes and payoffs is self-explanatory. Now, to better understand the role of information sets, consider the following interpretation. Imagine that each player i is in command of k i``a gents'' that play the game for him. For j=1, 2, ..., k i , the j th agent (of player i) is in charge of all decision nodes in the j th information set U i j . Before the start of the game player i instructs the agents and gives each of them a strategy. Then after the game starts the agents cannot communicate with each other (and with their boss). Now suppose that the play of the game has progressed to a certain node v # U i j P i ; that is, the next move should be played by the j th agent of player i, who must choose one outgoing edge of node v. At this time the only information available to this agent is the description of the game 1 and instructions obtained from his``boss'' (player i) before the start of the game. In particular, all nodes in U i j appear identical to this agent since he is not told which path led to his information set. Since all nodes in the same information set arè`i somorphic'' the agent specifies one choice that is valid for any node in the information set.
The introduction of information sets allows for descriptions of complex games in which the players do not have complete information on the actions of the other players and even their own previous actions. Formally we say that a game is of complete information if and only if each information set is a singleton. Otherwise we say that the game is of incomplete information. Examples of games of complete information are chess and tic-tac-toe. Examples of games of incomplete information are bridge and poker. Also, any off-line request answer game is a game of complete information and any on-line request answer game is a game of incomplete information.
B.2. Games in Strategic Form
An n-person game in strategic form consists of a set N=[1, 2, ..., n] of players and for each player i, i=1, 2, ..., n, there is a set S i of pure strategies. Also there is a function H : S 1 _S 2 _ } } } _S n Ä R n , called the payoff function. Each vector s # S 1 _S 2 _ } } } _S n is called a pure strategy profile and for each strategy profile s the i th coordinate H*(s) of H(s) specifies the payoff for the i th player for a play where the players choose their respective strategies according to s.
As may be expected, the transformation from an extensive form to strategic form is many-to-one. Indeed, going from extensive form to strategic form abstracts away some information given in the extensive form (e.g., the order of the moves) so that some information is lost.
18 However, this transformation always preserves the sets of pure and mixed strategy sets and their (expected) payoffs.
A key step in transforming an extensive form into strategic form is defining thè`p ure strategies'' in the extensive form game. Intuitively, in an extensive form game a pure strategy for a player is a list of edge labels, one for each of his information sets. Formally, let 1 be an n-person game in extensive form. Consider player i and let
] be the set of his k i information sets. Each information set U i j contains decision nodes that have the same number of outgoing edges and we denote the set of choices (labels of outgoing edges) of each node in U i the set of pure strategies of player i. It remains to define the payoff associated with a pure strategy profile s=(s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n ) of the n players. For each pure strategy profile s, and for each leaf l denote by p(l | s) the probability that the leaf l is reached, given the profile s. For each leaf l denote by H(l) the vector of expected payoffs associated with l (as defined by the extensive form). Then, the vector payoff is H(s)= :
Suppose that the inequality (9) holds. Then by Yao's inequality (8)
and, therefore, the best randomized algorithm for the on-line player is not c-competitive.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Suppose that (2) and (3) hold with respect to some probability distribution y( j). Hence, for all sufficiently large n (for which A n *)>0)
A n * c$<c.
By assumption (3) and since ALG is c$-competitive it must be that :ÂA n * Ä 0. But this contradicts assumption (2). It follows that R OBL (ALG) c.
